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THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION: RECONCILING TEACHER
TENURE AND THE CURRENT STATE OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION
Michael J. DeJianne*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that the
administration and implementation of the public school system is the most
important function of state and local governments.1 Specifically, the
Court’s unanimous ruling in Brown v. Board of Education emphasized
education’s significance to a child’s potential success in life and the
survival of any democratic society.2 The decision famously held, “[s]uch
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.”3 These words,
though written by Chief Justice Earl Warren more than six decades ago,
still hold true and reflect this country’s enormous investment of time,
money, and effort into creating an education system with the goal of giving
every child the tools necessary to succeed in life and ultimately foster our
democracy.
Though its importance is rarely called into question, the level of
constitutional protection offered to education has resulted in controversial
judicial rulings.4 Some state courts elevate the right to education to a
fundamental interest,5 while the United States Supreme Court6 and other
state courts have declined to do so.7 Because those states and the federal
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.B.A., 2012, Seton Hall
University; B.A., 2009, Providence College. I want to thank Dean Mark Alexander for all
the guidance and support in writing this Comment. I am also thankful for my family’s love,
patience, and words of encouragement, especially those of my wife, Corinne, my brothers,
Peter and Thomas, and my parents, Joseph and Lorraine.
1 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2 Id.
3 Id. (emphasis added).
4 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (holding
that education is not a fundamental right while emphasizing its high importance to society).
5
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971) (holding that education is a
fundamental right).
6 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59.
7 Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 2865 (N.J. 1973) (holding that education is not a
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government offer a lower level of equal protection analysis to education,
statutes that allegedly detract from education’s quality must only be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.8 These decisions
helped shape this country’s state and national education policy and, some
argue, contributed to a deteriorating experience in the American
classroom.9
Some of the most controversial legislation surrounding education
policy is teacher tenure statutes. Tenure is an employment protection
awarded to teachers,10 the qualifications of which vary by state. Though
the right to tenure does not technically create absolute immunity from
dismissal, tenure reform advocates argue that some state statutes protect
ineffective teachers from termination and thereby directly harm the quality
of education.11 Overturning these statutes has proven to be difficult,
especially when state supreme courts offer education the lowest level of
equal protection analysis.12
In August of 2014, a California district court held that certain state
teacher tenure statutes violate the California Constitution.13 In Vergara v.
State of California, Judge Rolf Treu held that the challenged teacher tenure
statutes detracted from the quality of California’s education and enjoined
their enforcement.14 Because California considers education a fundamental
right, state courts must apply the highest level of equal protection
analysis.15 Plaintiffs in New York subsequently challenged state teacher
tenure statutes in a similar fashion.16 With the upcoming appeal of the
Vergara decision and a trial scheduled in 2015 for Davids v. New York,17 it
is important to analyze whether teacher tenure statutes detract from the
quality of education and therefore violate a state’s constitution.
This Comment aims to answer these questions, examine the plaintiffs’

fundamental right).
8 See, e.g., id at 496–99.
9 See Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide
Public Education, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 49 (2011).
10 See Arnold Shep Cohen, Striking a Balance Between Teachers’ Employment Rights
and Professional Responsibilities, N.J. LAW., July 1993, at 43 (outlining various state laws
regulating teacher tenure, including probationary periods and teacher effectiveness).
11 See Nicholas Dagostino, Giving the School Bully a Timeout: Protecting Urban
Students from Teachers’ Unions, 63 ALA. L. REV. 177, 195 (2011).
12 See generally, infra Parts II & III.
13 Vergara v. California, 2014 WL 6478415, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).
14 Id. at *5–7.
15 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1257 (Cal. 1971).
16 See Javier C. Hernandez, New York Educators Fight Back on Attacks to Tenure,
N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/nyregion/new-yorkeducators-fight-back-on-attacks-to-tenure-.html.
17 Davids v. New York, No. 101105/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed July 24, 2014).
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arguments in Vergara and Davids, and evaluate the effectiveness of New
Jersey’s recent teacher tenure reform. Parts II and III of this Comment
outline federal and state equal protection analysis and the level of
protection education receives from the Supreme Court and the state courts
in New Jersey, New York, and California. Part IV examines the current
landscape of teacher tenure in these states and explains Judge Treu’s
analysis in the Vergara decision. Part V then applies the plaintiffs’
arguments in Vergara and Davids to California and New York’s equal
protection clauses. Ultimately, this Comment advocates for courts to
accept the plaintiffs’ arguments, recognize the states’ teacher tenure
statutes as void, and direct the California and New York legislatures to
adopt an approach similar to New Jersey’s recent reform. Part VI
concludes.
II. HOW IS EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYZED?
A. Federal Equal Protection Analysis
Before evaluating the constitutional validity of current teacher tenure
statutes as they relate to the right to public education, it is necessary to
examine courts’ equal protection clause analyses. The Supreme Court has
traditionally utilized a three-tiered test when legislation is challenged under
the United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause (“the Equal
Protection Clause”).18 First, laws that affect fundamental rights or classify
individuals based on race and national origin are subject to the highest level
of scrutiny.19 Legislation that falls under this category must serve a
compelling interest, and the government action must be narrowly tailored
to allow the violation of equal protection.20 Second, laws that classify
individuals based on gender are traditionally analyzed under intermediate
scrutiny.21 This analysis requires the law to be substantially related to an
important government interest.22 Finally, at a minimum, any statutory
classification must be rationally related to a legitimate government
interest.23 All laws, whether passed by Congress or state legislatures, must
meet this constitutional floor.24 Any law that fails to meet this “rational
basis” standard violates the Equal Protection Clause25 and will be void.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
See id. (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672 (1966)).
Id.
See id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
Id.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).
See id.
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B. New Jersey’s Equal Protection Analysis
Though the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis is highly
influential, each state utilizes a unique approach to its respective state
constitution’s equal protection clause. The New Jersey Constitution’s
Liberty Clause (“the Liberty Clause”) reads, “[a]ll persons are by nature
free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights,
among which are those enjoying and defending life and liberty, of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and
obtaining safety and happiness.”26 While the Liberty Clause does not
explicitly mention equal protection, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
read it to grant equal protection under the law.27
When a statute is challenged under the Liberty Clause, the court
departs from the three-tiered federal analysis and opts for a balancing test
that weighs the right violated against the need for the alleged inequality.28
In Greenberg v. Kimmelman, the New Jersey Supreme Court outlined this
fluid balancing test where state courts must consider “[t]he nature of the
affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes
upon it, and the public need for the restriction.”29 According to the court,
this analysis uses an approach implicit in the federal test.30 Justice Pollock
explained, “in [federal] equal protection analysis, the nature of the right is
the crucial consideration in characterizing a right as ‘fundamental,’ the
initial step in determining whether the governmental regulation will receive
‘strict scrutiny’ or a more relaxed standard of judicial review.”31 While the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s test is less mechanical than the federal test, it
still aims to define the importance of the right and analyze the level of
protection that right receives from the Liberty Clause. This guarantees
protection against unequal treatment of people who should be treated alike,
such as all students in the classroom.32

26
27
28
29
30
31
32

N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1.
See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211 (N.J. 2006).
See Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985).
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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C. California’s Equal Protection Analysis
Much like New Jersey, California applies a different equal protection
analysis than its federal counterpart. California’s equal protection clause is
in-depth and reads more like a statute than a constitutional provision.33
Like the Equal Protection Clause, however, California’s equal protection
clause still ensures that “[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the
laws.”34 At its core, this article promises that persons who are similarly
situated are treated equally under the law.35
The California Supreme Court has held that the state’s equal
protection clause possesses validity independent from the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.36 When legislative action
classifies individuals and is challenged as violating the state’s constitution,
California courts use a two-tiered standard of review.37 The California
Court of Appeals explained in Molar v. Gates that strict scrutiny analysis is
required for the violation of fundamental interests or suspect
classifications.38 The state must show that the violation of the right or the
creation of such classification is necessary to accomplish a compelling
interest.39
California does not recognize a distinction between
classifications of race or gender.40 Instead, the state analyzes these
classifications under the same level of scrutiny.41 All other legislation must
bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, meeting the
constitutional floor that the Supreme Court requires.42

33 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7. In 1979, the California Legislature amended this
provision to specifically outline how instruments of the state must enforce equal protection.
This clearly departs from New Jersey, New York, and the United States Constitution’s
respective equal protection amendments, as it is much more in depth.
34 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
35 In re Evans, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
36 See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d. 592, 598 (Cal.
1979).
37 See Molar v. Gates, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
38 Id. at 247.
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d. 529, 540–41 (Cal. 1974) (holding that a
California statute prohibiting women from obtaining bartender licenses compels the
application of strict scrutiny analysis and ultimately violates the equal protection clause of
the California Constitution).
41 Id.
42 Molar, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
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D. New York’s Equal Protection Analysis
New York’s Constitution extends equal protection of state laws to all
persons and prohibits the violation of an individual’s civil rights.43 When
statutes are challenged under this constitutional provision, the New York
Court of Appeals opts to use an analysis that closely resembles the
Supreme Court’s three-tiered test.44 First, strict scrutiny is appropriate in
New York for an alleged discrimination based on suspect classification or
violation of a fundamental interest.45 Second, in Alevy v. Downstate
Medical Center, the New York Court of Appeals explained intermediate
scrutiny, or the “sliding scale” test.46 The court first must ask if the alleged
discrimination satisfies a substantial state interest and furthers a legitimate
government purpose.47 If the discrimination or violation of rights serves a
substantial state interest and furthers a governmental purpose, then the
court must answer if the objectives could be achieved by less offensive
means.48 Third, similar to the federal analysis, all classifications must be at
least rationally related to a legitimate government interest.49
III. IS THERE A RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION?
A.

The Guarantee of an Equal Education

The administration of public schools largely falls on state and
municipal governments.50 While some argue that the United States
Department of Education has taken strides towards creating a national
education policy,51 state constitutions, particularly those of New Jersey,
California, and New York, require that their respective legislatures provide
free schooling to all children.52 The practical effect of this constitutional
obligation has led to legislatures passing numerous statutes that regulate
nearly every aspect of operating a statewide education system.53 These
include mechanisms for funding each school district, education standards
43

N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
See Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
45 Id. at 635.
46 See Alevy v. Downstate Med. Ctr., 348 N.E.2d 537, 545–46 (N.Y. 1976).
47 Id. at 545.
48 Id. at 546.
49 Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
50 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 7 (1973).
51 See Sarah G. Boyce, The Obsolescence of San Antonio v. Rodriguez in the Wake of
the Federal Government’s Quest to Leave No Child Behind, 61 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1027
(2012).
52 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
53 See, e.g., School Funding Reform Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-44 (West 2008)
(outlining the structure and calculations used to fund New Jersey’s public school system for
all children between the ages of five and eighteen).
44
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for student advancement, and evaluation criteria for teacher and
administrative job performance.54 These statutes show that education
policy is, very much so, both a state and local concern. When individuals
believe that this legislation detracts from the state’s educational experience,
the laws are challenged as violating the state’s guarantee of an education.55
Legal precedent in this area evaluates whether government benefits or
programs are elevated to fundamental rights. States provide many services
that its citizens need, some of which are mandated by their state
constitutions.56 For example, the New York Constitution requires the state
legislature to maintain a public welfare system in support of the needy.57
While this is certainly an important role for the government, the New York
Court of Appeals has held that public welfare is not a fundamental right.58
Likewise, education is not elevated to a fundamental right in many states,
and therefore receives a lower level of protection under a state’s equal
protection clause.59 But, as the Supreme Court explained, state laws that
violate equal protection must always bear at least some rational relationship
to a legitimate government interest.60 Therefore, in states where education
is not a fundamental right, laws cannot go below this constitutional floor
and detract from a basic level of education.
Many landmark judicial decisions regarding the administration of
education have focused on state funding mechanisms.61 In New Jersey,
California, and New York, the public school system is primarily funded by
general revenue raised through property and income taxes.62 Those
opposed to the funding scheme have argued that poorer school districts do
not have access to adequate tax revenue, resulting in an inferior educational
experience that violates the state’s constitutional obligation and equal

54 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44830 (West 2009) (outlining the employment qualifications
for public school teachers); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-44; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3220
(McKinney 2008) (requiring all students to participate in physical fitness exams during the
academic year).
55 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1 (challenging the constitutionality of the education
funding system in Texas).
56 See N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (requiring the state legislature to provide public
support to the needy).
57 Id.
58 Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.S.2d 359, 365 (N.Y. 1982).
59 See, e.g., id. (holding that education is not a fundamental right in New York).
60 Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).
61 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (challenging the
constitutionality of the education funding system used in New Jersey).
62 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8 (requiring that state revenue be set aside for public school
funding); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F (West 2008); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602 (McKinney
2014) (requiring that public money be made available to each school district from state and
local revenue).
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protection.63 Key cases from New Jersey, California, and New York are
helpful to summarize for purposes of this Comment. Each decision
discussed below outlines the obligation to provide an education and
analyzes whether the respective constitutional provisions recognize a
fundamental right. This will ultimately provide a framework to discuss
whether the challenged teacher tenure statutes violate the state constitution.
B. The Supreme Court’s View
There is neither an explicit nor an implicit guarantee to education
under the United States Constitution.64 The U.S. Supreme Court was
confronted with this question in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.65 At trial, plaintiffs argued that the Texas public education
financing system, through the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program
(“Program”), violated the Equal Protection Clause.66 The Program was
designed in response to the development of industrial cities and population
shifts, which resulted in many rural Texas communities lacking sufficient
public school funding.67 The legislature understood that disparities in
expenditures harmed the quality of education in rural districts and passed
legislation designed to increase funding.68 The Program supplied funds to
school districts from general state revenue, which financed each district
with roughly eighty percent of the annual school budget.69 The remaining
funds came directly from the district’s budget by way of local property
taxes, calculated as a percentage of residential and commercial property
value.70 The goal of the Program was twofold: (1) place the heaviest
burden on school districts most capable of paying and (2) ensure that every
school district contributes to the education of its children without
completely exhausting local resources.71
The plaintiffs came from Edgewood, the least affluent district in the
San Antonio area.72 Because of low property values and limited municipal
resources, the district could only contribute $26 to the education of each
student for the 1967–1968 academic year.73 With the contribution from the
Texas state revenue, total expenditures per student for the academic year
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1973).
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
Id.
Id. at 9–11.
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 9.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.

DEJIANNE (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

11/19/2015 2:45 PM

COMMENT

341

were $248.74 At trial, plaintiffs introduced the 1967–1968 expenditures of
Alamo Heights, the most affluent district in the San Antonio area.75
Because of greater property values and state contribution, Alamo Heights
supplied $594 per pupil.76 The federal district court concluded that the
Program failed strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause on
the basis that an individual’s wealth is a suspect classification, and
education is a fundamental right.77
The Supreme Court overturned the district court on two separate
grounds.78 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell explained that the
plaintiffs failed to offer evidence that the financing system discriminated
against a definable group of impoverished people and led to a total lack of
education.79 It was unclear to the majority if the Program discriminated
against all poor people, all people with lower property values, or the ten
percent of Texas school districts surveyed for purposes of trial.80 The
Court therefore concluded that the financing system did not disadvantage a
suspect class.81
The majority then held that education is not a fundamental right that
requires a higher level of scrutiny.82 Justice Powell explained that
education is vital in a free society, both to individual citizens and the
country as a whole.83 The importance of a state function, however, does
“not determine whether [that function] must be regarded as fundamental for
purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause.”84
Fundamental rights are provided to individuals through a guarantee in the
Constitution, while economic and social rights call for a lower level of
scrutiny under equal protection analysis.85 Because it is not explicitly nor
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, the Court concluded that
education is not a fundamental right.86

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id.
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 23–25.
Id. at 26–27.
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 34–35.
Id.
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C. New Jersey’s View
The New Jersey Supreme Court confronted a similar public school
funding issue in the same year as the Rodriguez decision.87 In Robinson v.
Cahill, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of New Jersey’s public
school financing plan.88 Much like Texas’ Program, New Jersey’s public
schools received funding from general state revenue and local property
taxes.89 This resulted in a disparity of dollars spent per pupil, particularly
in areas with low property values.90 The plaintiffs argued that this
inequality violated a student’s fundamental right to an education, asking the
court to declare the funding scheme as void on the basis of the Liberty
Clause.91
In addition to the guarantee of equal protection through the Liberty
Clause, the New Jersey Constitution requires the legislature to supply a
“thorough and efficient” public school system to all children.92 Plaintiffs
urged the court to invoke the highest level of scrutiny when evaluating the
funding scheme’s violation of this constitutional provision.93 The plaintiffs
specifically pointed to the Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriguez, which
elevated explicit constitutional guarantees to the level of fundamental
rights.94 The plaintiffs argued that the holding in Rodriguez only bolstered
Chief Justice Warren’s unanimous decision in Brown, where the Court held
that “[s]uch an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is
a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”95
The New Jersey Supreme Court used the Rodriguez decision to guide
its analysis and found that the funding disparities neither violated a
fundamental right nor invoked the highest level of scrutiny under the
Liberty Clause.96 Chief Justice Weintraub explained that the guarantee of
an efficient education does not mandate a uniform expenditure plan.97 The
constitutional guarantee implicitly involves municipal participation, which
undoubtedly leads to varying budgets and expenditures.98
While
involvement at the state level is constitutionally mandated, the funding
disparities that result from the statutory scheme are not “irrational” and do
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
Id. at 276.
Id.
Id. at 276–77.
See id. at 277.
N.J. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
Robinson, 303 A.2d at 28384.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 284 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
See id. at 282.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 286–87.
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not invoke a higher level of scrutiny.99 Therefore, the requirement to
furnish a service does not automatically elevate the state’s obligation to a
fundamental right.100
D. New York’s View
Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, New York’s public school
funding scheme faced numerous challenges in the Board of Education v.
Nyquist line of cases.101 Like New Jersey and Texas, New York’s funding
scheme resulted in disparities where property values were low.102 In the
case’s final disposition, the New York Court of Appeals looked to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez and ultimately held that education
is not a fundamental right.103 Justice Jones explained that public education
is one of the most important services that the state performs, a notion
expressly manifested in the New York State Constitution.104 As mentioned
supra, however, dedication to a government program does not
automatically elevate the level of scrutiny to that of a fundamental right.105
Other constitutionally mandated programs, such as public assistance to the
needy, are also very important but do not call for a higher level of
scrutiny.106 Strict or intermediate scrutiny is appropriate only when the
state action groups persons together by reason of personal characteristics,
such as race or gender.107 For these reasons, the court held that the proper
standard of review for purported violations of the right to education in New
York is rational basis.108
E. California’s View
California’s view of public education departs from the holdings in
Rodriguez, Robinson, and Nyquist.109 In Serrano v. Priest, California’s
public school funding statutes encountered a challenge for violating
California’s equal protection clause.110 Similar to challenges in New York

99

Robinson, 303 A.2d at 286.
Id.
101 Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), modified by
Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), modified by Bd. of Educ.
v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982).
102 See Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 361.
103 Id. at 367.
104 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366.
105 Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366.
106 N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366.
107 Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366.
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
110 Id. at 1244.
100

DEJIANNE (DO NOT DELETE)

344

11/19/2015 2:45 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:333

and New Jersey, plaintiffs attacked the statutes for creating funding
disparities that resulted in substandard educational opportunities for
students living in school districts with lower property values.111 The
plaintiffs argued that this violated a fundamental right.112
The California Supreme Court believed that the plaintiffs’ claims had
legal merit and remanded the proceedings for trial.113 Writing for the
majority, Justice Sullivan noted that the right to public education in
California is a fundamental interest,114 requiring a higher level of scrutiny
for an alleged violation. In support of this conclusion, the court pointed to
Chief Justice Warren’s decision in Brown.115 Justice Sullivan explained
that the majority in Brown espoused two themes when speaking about the
importance of education: (1) the importance to individuals and (2) the
importance to society.116 Both of these themes directly impact the success
of America’s democracy, and are both supported by the language in
California’s Constitution: “A general diffusion of knowledge and
intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of
the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural
improvement.”117 Because of the “distinctive and priceless” role that
education serves in society, the majority held that the right to education is a
fundamental interest that requires the highest level of scrutiny and
protection.118
F. What Really Affects a Student’s Education?
The plaintiffs in the preceding cases attacked plans funding education
in Texas, New Jersey, California, and New York.119 With the exception of
California, the courts largely rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that education

111

Id.
See id. at 1255 (noting “[p]laintiffs’ contentionthat education is a fundamental
interest”).
113 Id. at 1265.
114 See id. at 1255–56 (“The fundamental importance of education has been recognized
in other contexts by the United States Supreme Court and by this court. These
decisionswhile not legally controlling on the exact issue before usare persuasive in
their accurate factual description of the significance of learning.”).
115 Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1256 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
116 Id. at 1257.
117 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1258 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. IX, §
1).
118 Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1258.
119 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano, 487 P.2d at
1241; Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d
359 (N.Y. 1982).
112
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deserves heightened constitutional protection.120 The courts held that
disparities in funding do not violate a fundamental right, while recognizing
education’s significance to society.121 As mentioned supra, the importance
of education is exemplified by this country’s commitment of time, money,
and effort into educating every child. Even though not every state
recognizes education as a fundamental right, this commitment compels
legislatures to ensure that laws governing educational policy meet the
required level of equal protection, even if that level is the “constitutional
floor.”122 Laws that fail to meet the standard and detract from a student’s
education should, therefore, be declared void.123
Though funding is an important aspect of operating state public school
systems, it is not the primary influence on education’s quality.124 For
example, some statistics show that Newark, New Jersey spends about
$22,000 per pupil, while only 22% of students graduate from high
school.125 In comparison, Chatham, New Jersey spends about $12,000 per
pupil and has a high school graduation rate of virtually 100%.126 Some
may argue that comparing New Jersey’s largest city to a small suburb
creates an inaccurate portrayal of Newark’s school system. But the facts
cannot be ignored: Newark, and many cities like it, spends huge sums of
money on its public school system with extremely disappointing results.
Therefore, other factors have as much, if not more, influence on a child’s
education.
The Supreme Court has recognized some of these other factors that
affect public education’s quality.127 In Brown, the Court famously struck
down the segregation of children in public schools based on race.128 Even
if facilities were “tangibly” equal, the psychological effect of separating
students based on physical characteristics negatively impacts students’
education.129 The Court, therefore, recognized that environmental factors

120
121

See supra note 119.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30; Robinson, 303 A.2d at 283–84; Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at

366.
122

See Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).
See id.
124 See Dagostino supra note 11, at 180.
125 Id.
126 STATE
OF NEW JERSEY,
NJ School Performance Report 7 (2014),
http://www.state.nj.us/education/pr/2013/27/270785010.pdf; SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE
CHATHAMS,
Budget
Newsletter
2
(Apr.
2014),
http://www.chathamnj.org/cms/lib/NJ01000518/Centricity/Domain/992/Budget%20Newsletter%2020142015.pdf.
127 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
128 Id. at 495.
129 Id. at 494.
123
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have an impact on education’s quality.130
The Supreme Court also held that facilities and materials play an
important role in education’s quality.131 In Sweatt v. Painter, the plaintiff
was denied admission to the University of Texas Law School based on his
race.132 Texas operated a law school solely for African Americans,
something that the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found as an appropriate
remedy for the plaintiff.133 The Supreme Court disagreed and ordered the
University of Texas to admit the plaintiff to its law school.134 In its
analysis, the Court compared the schools’ facilities.135 The University of
Texas had access to scholarship funds, moot court facilities, and 65,000
volumes in its library.136 The African American law school had no faculty,
almost no volumes in its library, and lacked accreditation.137 The Court
held that the insufficient facilities detracted from the plaintiff’s legal
education and, therefore, violated his constitutional rights.138 Implicit in its
decision, Painter recognized that facilities and academic materials have an
effect on one’s education.139
While funding, environmental factors, facilities, and materials all play
a vital role in the quality of a public school, effective teachers play the most
vital role.140 A teacher has the most lasting impact on a student’s
education, with some studies showing that students with effective teachers
earn more money, are less likely to have children in their teens, and are
more likely to attend college.141 According to the same study, an
ineffective teacher could lead to almost $2.5 million of lost lifetime
earnings per classroom.142 Providing the best teachers for students only
seems logical with these results; however, some argue that teacher tenure
statutes directly detract from this goal by protecting ineffective teachers’
positions.143 If teachers detract from the classroom experience and are
130

See id.
See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
132 Id. at 631.
133 Id. at 632.
134 Id. at 636.
135 Id. at 632–33.
136 Id.
137 Painter, 339 U.S. at 633.
138 Id. at 636.
139 See id.
140 See, e.g., Annie Lowrey, Big Study Links Good Teachers to Lasting Gain, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/06/education/big-study-links-goodteachers-to-lasting-gain.html?pagewanted=all.
141 Id.
142 Id. (“Replacing a poor teacher with an average one would raise a single classroom’s
lifetime earnings by about $266,000 . . . . Multiply that by a career’s worth of classrooms.”).
143 Dagostino, supra note 11, at 195.
131
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protected from termination, this practice may have constitutional
implications even at the lowest equal protection analysis. This leads us to
an important discussion about teacher tenure and its effect on the classroom
experience.
IV. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF TEACHER TENURE
A. What is Tenure?
Tenure was initially established to provide protection from random
termination and create a degree of permanency and expertise within the
teaching profession.144 Tenure guarantees that an employee can only be
dismissed for cause after a hearing is held and a decision is rendered by the
state’s education agency.145 Contrary to popular belief, tenure for public
school teachers does not provide absolute immunity from termination.146
As explained in Donahoo v. Board of Education, the goal of tenure is to
ensure that the best teachers continue service and are protected from
termination based on arbitrary or capricious reasons.147 Proponents of
tenure argue that this protection adds value to the classroom experience,
while opponents believe it restricts the ability of administrators to
effectively shape state education policies and standards.148 Laws regulating
the hearing process vary by state; however, the charges that an individual
teacher may face for termination are less varied.149 Therefore, it is possible
to terminate a tenured teacher’s position.150
B. Efforts at Tenure Reform: The TEACHNJ Act
The recent economic downturn, shrinking state budgets, and
underperforming schools brought teacher tenure to the forefront of the
education reform debate.151 Many states passed legislation modifying
teacher evaluations, extending the probationary period before teachers
become tenure-eligible, and eliminating the highly controversial “last-in,

144

See Laura McNeal, Total Recall: The Rise and Fall of Teacher Tenure, 30 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 489, 491 (2013).
145 See id. at 492.
146 Cohen, supra note 10, at 43.
147 Id. (citing Donahoo v. Bd. of Educ., 109 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ill. 1952)).
148 Compare McNeal, supra note 144, at 490 (explaining that recent attempts to
eliminate tenure have been viewed by many teachers as an attack on the profession), with
Dagostino, supra note 11, at 195 (arguing that tenure keeps ineffective teachers in the
classroom).
149 Cohen, supra note 10, at 43 (noting that a teacher may be disciplined for inefficiency,
incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other just cause).
150 Id.
151 See McNeal, supra note 144, at 489.
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first-out” seniority system utilized for school layoffs.152 New Jersey was
not immune to the budgetary and education issues faced by other states,
and Republican Governor Chris Christie felt that tenure reform would help
improve some of the state’s ailing school districts.153 After a highly
publicized fight between Governor Christie, the Democratic controlled
legislature, and the New Jersey Education Association, all three eventually
worked together to create the first comprehensive tenure reform in New
Jersey since 1909.154
In 2012, New Jersey passed the Teacher Effectiveness and
Accountability for the Children of New Jersey Act (the “TEACHNJ Act”)
for the 2013–2014 academic year.155 The TEACHNJ Act addresses the
probationary period and evaluation process for public school teachers in
New Jersey.156 As mandated by the law, teachers become eligible for
tenure after one year of mentorship with an experienced teacher followed
by two positive evaluations over the following three years.157 The new
evaluation system rates teachers as “ineffective,” “partially effective,”
“effective,” or “highly effective.”158 A panel of experienced teachers and
administrators completes the evaluations, balancing both subjective and
objective factors.159 Once tenure is earned, two consecutive years of an
“ineffective” rating result in a loss of tenure.160 The teacher then must have
two consecutive years of “effective” or “highly effective” ratings in order
to avoid dismissal.161 Further, the costs of a dismissal hearing are capped
at $7500.162 According to supporters of the TEACHNJ Act, this allows
administrators and state regulators to proceed against an ineffective teacher
without being discouraged by expensive and ongoing litigation, a problem
that existed before the TEACHNJ Act’s passage.163

152 See id. at 498–99 (detailing Michigan’s new law that created a five-year probationary
period, Indiana’s new law that created four categories for teacher evaluations, and Nevada’s
new law that eliminated automatic seniority protection during school layoffs).
153 See Dagostino, supra note 11, at 180 (explaining that only twenty-two percent of
students in Newark, New Jersey graduate from high school); McNeal, supra note 144, at
501–02.
154 McNeal, supra note 144, at 501.
155 See Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the Children of New Jersey Act,
N.J. STAT. § 18A:6-117 (West 2012).
156 N.J. STAT. § 18A:6-118(b).
157 Id.
158 McNeal, supra note 144, at 502.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 502–03.
162 Id. at 503.
163 Id.; Dagostino, supra note 11, at 194 (explaining that in some states, a legal battle for
teacher dismissal costs an average of $500,000).
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C. Legal Challenges Brought Against Teacher Tenure
1. Vergara v. California
In the same year that New Jersey passed the TEACHNJ Act, tenure
reformers in California mounted a legal battle in Vergara v. California.164
The plaintiffs challenged five statutes from the California Education Code
that allegedly violated the equal protection clause of the California
Constitution.165 The statutes included California Education Code: (1)
Section 44929.21(b) (the “Permanent Employment Statute”); (2) Section
44934 and Sections 44938(b)(1)–(2) (“Dismissal Statutes”); and (3)
Section 44955 (“Last-In-First-Out Statutes” or “LIFO Statutes”).166 The
plaintiffs argued that each statute protected ineffective teachers from
dismissal, which contributed to a failing education system within their
respective school districts.167
Because education is considered a
fundamental right in California, the plaintiffs believed that the statutes
failed under strict scrutiny analysis and violated the guarantee of equal
protection under the California Constitution.168
Arguing before Judge Treu, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the
Permanent Employment Statute disadvantaged both students and competent
teachers.169 As mandated by the statute, teachers are informed of their
tenure status at the end of a two-year probationary period.170 In practice,
the decision must be communicated by March 15th of the second year,
approximately three months before the end of the academic term.171 This
requires administrators to make the actual decision well before the March
15th deadline.172 The teacher simultaneously undergoes a credentialing
process during the first two years of employment; however, that decision
cannot be made until the actual expiration of the second academic term.173
This inconsistency can result in a district having a tenured teacher without
state credentials.174 Plaintiffs also presented evidence that if any doubt
arose as to a teacher’s ability, time constraints forced administrators to
make a tenure decision without adequate opportunity for the teacher to

164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

See Vergara v. California, 2014 WL 6478415 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).
Id.; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.21 (West 2014).
Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4.
Id.
Id.

DEJIANNE (DO NOT DELETE)

350

11/19/2015 2:45 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:333

prove competency.175
Judge Treu held that this statute unfairly affected both students and
teachers.176 Because education is considered a fundamental right in
California, the state must offer a compelling reason for students to be
deprived of potentially competent teachers and for teachers to not have
enough time to prove their abilities within the classroom. 177 Judge Treu
found that the state failed its burden and held that the Permanent
Employment Statute violated the equal protection clause of the California
Constitution.178
Judge Treu also found that the Dismissal Statutes violated the equal
protection clause of the California Constitution.179 Plaintiffs presented
evidence that a California dismissal hearing may take up to ten years and
would cost a school district between $50,000 and $450,000.180 During
trial, defense witnesses admitted that it was nearly “impossible” to
terminate a tenured teacher’s position under the current statutory scheme.181
The state argued that a teacher, or any public employee, is entitled to due
process during a dismissal hearing, making the Dismissal Statutes
necessary.182
Judge Treu agreed that due process is a right, but explained that other
certified school employees must only be made aware of their dismissal
charges and be given the right to respond at a hearing.183 Judge Treu found
no compelling reason to give teachers extra due process protections
afforded by the challenged statutes, particularly when the result would keep
ineffective teachers employed.184 While teachers, and other public
employees, have a right to due process, this right cannot detract from the
fundamental right afforded to California’s students.185 For these reasons,
the court found that the Dismissal Statutes violated the plaintiffs’
fundamental right to an education and the state’s equal protection clause.186
Lastly, Judge Treu found that the LIFO Statutes resulted in
“classroom disruption” and agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that the

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id at *5.
Id.
Id.
Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6.
Id.
Id.
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provision violated a student’s constitutional rights.187 When school layoffs
are necessary, the LIFO Statutes regulate teacher dismissals;188 the lasthired teacher is the first dismissed, without consideration of the teacher’s
quality or effectiveness.189 Judge Treu explained that the defendants would
need to present a compelling reason for the “de facto retention of
incompetent [teachers]” in order to defend the LIFO Statutes’ existence.190
Judge Treu found the logic of the defendant’s position to be
“unfathomable.”191 California recognizes education as a fundamental right
that requires the highest level of equal protection analysis.192
Automatically keeping ineffective teachers in the classroom directly
impacts education’s quality, violating students’ constitutional rights.193 For
these reasons, Judge Treu held that the LIFO Statutes failed strict scrutiny
analysis.194
2. Davids v. New York
Shortly after Judge Treu decided Vergara, two separate lawsuits were
filed in New York challenging the state’s teacher tenure statutes.195 In
Wright v. New York and Davids v. New York, plaintiffs submitted
complaints arguing that certain New York Education Law statutes keep
ineffective teachers in the classroom and infringe upon a student’s
fundamental right to a sound and basic education.196 Similar to the tenure
provisions in Vergara, the plaintiffs in Wright and Davids challenged New
York Education Laws: (1) Section 2509, Section 2573, and Section 3012
(“Permanent Employment Statutes”); (2) Section 3020 (“Dismissal
Statutes”); and (3) Section 2585 and Section 3013 (“Last-In-First-Out
Statutes” or “LIFO Statutes”).197 Because the two lawsuits have similar
arguments against the same statutes, Judge Phillip Minardo granted the
New York Attorney General’s motion to consolidate the cases.198 Going
187

Id. at *6.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955 (West 2014).
189 Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955.
190 Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6.
191 Id.
192 Id. at *1.
193 Id. at *7.
194 Id.
195 See Hernandez, supra note 16.
196 Complaint at 3, Wright v. New York, No. 1500641/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed July
28, 2014) (“This suit challenges the constitutionality, in whole or in part, of Education Laws
§§ 2509, 2510, 2573, 2585, 2588, 2590, 3012, 3012-c, 3020, and 3020(a) (the ‘Challenged
Statutes’).”) [hereinafter Wright Compl.]; Complaint at 3, Davids v. New York, No.
101105/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed July 24, 2014) [hereinafter Davids Compl.].
197 Wright Compl. at 3; Davids Compl. at 3.
198 Beth Fertig, Judge Approves Merger of Teacher Tenure Lawsuits in New York,
188
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forward, plaintiffs will now argue solely under Davids v. New York.199
V. DO THE CHALLENGED TENURE STATUTES VIOLATE A RIGHT TO
EDUCATION?
The Vergara plaintiffs will have their arguments tested in an
upcoming appeal, while the plaintiffs in Davids must argue in a state that
provides the lowest level of equal protection analysis to education.200 Both
New York and California have recognized the importance of education and
the integral role that teachers play in a child’s academic development.201
The courts, therefore, must determine if the challenged teacher tenure
statutes detract from a student’s education and survive the state’s equal
protection analysis.
A. The California Appellate Court Should Uphold Vergara
Tenure reform advocates viewed the Vergara decision as a victory,
while teacher unions across the nation accused Judge Treu of blaming
teachers for failing educational institutions.202 In response to the court’s
opinion, California Governor Jerry Brown appealed the decision,
explaining that “[c]hanges of this magnitude, as a matter of law and policy,
require appellate review.”203 As explained supra, the California Supreme
Court has held that education is a fundamental right.204 This affords
students the highest level of scrutiny under equal protection analysis,
requiring that a violation of that right be necessary and narrowly tailored to
accomplish a compelling interest.205 Further, teachers are the most
important aspect of a student’s education.206 An effective teacher leads to
the heightened possibility of personal and professional success.207 While
teacher tenure is certainly good public policy in order to ensure some level
of employment protection and expertise in the profession, there is no
compelling reason for that protection to infringe upon a fundamental right,
WNYC.ORG (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.wnyc.org/story/teacher_tenure_lawsuits_
proceed_to_court/.
199 Id.
200 Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982); Adam Nagourney,
California Governor Appeals Court Ruling Overturning Protections for Teachers, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/us/california-governor-fightsdecision-on-teacher-tenure.html?_r=0.
201 Serrano v. Priest, 467 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971); see Vergara v. California, 2014
WL 6478415, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014); Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366.
202 Nagourney, supra note 200.
203 Id.
204 See Serrano, 467 P.2d at 1255.
205 Molar v. Gates, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
206 See Lowrey, supra note 140.
207 Id.
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particularly when the effects on a student are potentially disastrous. For
this reason, the appellate division of the superior court should uphold the
decision in Vergara and force the California legislature to reform state
tenure statutes.
California’s Permanent Employment Statute, Dismissal Statutes, and
LIFO Statute violate the California Constitution and conflict with tenure’s
goal of providing a level of expertise within the profession.208 The
plaintiffs’ evidence shows that a teacher: (1) is granted tenure after an
inadequate amount of time, (2) is afforded due process protection that
makes it nearly impossible to be dismissed, and (3) is automatically
protected during school layoffs regardless of the teacher’s quality or
effectiveness.209 This system provides tenure and termination protection to
ineffective teachers.
The Permanent Employment Statute forces administrators to evaluate
a teacher’s effectiveness in an inadequate time period.210 In practice, the
statute uses one full academic year as the primary criteria for granting
tenure.211 Dr. John Deasy, Superintendent of the Los Angeles School
District, testified that the mandated time period is insufficient to determine
tenure eligibility.212 Both the plaintiffs and defendants offered evidence
that a three- to five-year probationary period would be better suited to
evaluate a teacher’s abilities.213 As previously mentioned, administrators
use only one full year of evaluations to determine a teacher’s eligibility for
tenure.214 Because of the short timeframe, the Permanent Employment
Statute creates a possibility that ineffective teachers are granted tenure.
The results ultimately detract from California’s education, harm students,
and violate the state’s equal protection clause.
The Dismissal Statutes discourage administrators from pursuing the
termination of an ineffective teacher due to the unnecessarily heightened
due process procedures.215 The plaintiffs submitted evidence that a
dismissal proceeding can cost upwards of $450,000, and defense witnesses

208

See McNeal, supra note 144, at 491.
See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.21(b) (West 2014); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44934; CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 44938(b)(1)(2); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955; Vergara v. California, 2014 WL
6478415 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).
210 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.21(b); Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4.
211 See supra note 210.
212 Motoko Rich, Deasy Resigns as Los Angeles Schools Chief After Mounting
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/us/lausd-johndeasy-resigns-superintendent-los-angeles.html.
213 Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5.
214 Id.
215 See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44934, 44938(b)(1)–(2); Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at
*5.
209
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testified that the termination of a tenured teacher is “extremely rare.”216
The high cost of litigation caused by the mandated process discourages
administrators from pursuing a dismissal.217 This only protects ineffective
teachers and detracts from education in California.
California also protects ineffective teachers through its LIFO Statutes.
When layoffs occur, no weight is given to a teacher’s effectiveness or
abilities; rather, seniority is the sole criterion used for dismissals.218 This
could conceivably lead to a situation where a highly effective teacher with
ten years of experience is dismissed instead of an ineffective teacher with
eleven years of experience. The Vergara defendants could not offer a
logical reason why such a system should exist.219 As explained by Judge
Treu, the defendants’ position requires them to argue that a competent
teacher’s position should be terminated over an ineffective teacher’s
position simply because of his or her hire date.220 As with the Permanent
Employment Statute and Dismissal Statutes, the LIFO Statute detracts from
the quality of education and violates California’s equal protection clause.
Under California’s strict scrutiny analysis, the defendants fail to show
that the challenged statutes are necessary for a compelling state interest.221
The legislature’s goal to protect teacher employment cannot trump the
constitutional obligation to provide all students with an education,
particularly when the quality of education is negatively impacted. Granting
tenure to ineffective teachers, and preventing their subsequent dismissal,
violates a fundamental right and detracts from expertise within the
profession. The challenged statutes, therefore, violate the equal protection
clause of the California Constitution and directly undermine tenure’s goals.
For these reasons, the appellate court should uphold Judge Treu’s decision
and declare the statutes as void.
B. The Current New York Statutes Should Be Declared Void
As mentioned supra, the Court of Appeals of New York held in
Nyquist that education is not a fundamental right.222 Therefore, an alleged
violation under the state’s equal protection clause need only be rationally
related to an important government interest to be constitutional.223 In

216

Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5.
Id.
218 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955; Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6.
219 Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6.
220 See id.
221 Molar v. Gates, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (requiring a compelling
need to violate a fundamental right).
222 Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982).
223 Id.
217
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Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, the court established the
constitutional floor to be met in order for the legislature to meet its
obligation to provide an education.224 Judge Pigott explained that schools
must teach “the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to
enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants
capable of voting and serving on a jury.”225 In order for the plaintiffs in
Davids to succeed, they must demonstrate a causal connection between the
challenged statutes and a failure to provide students with a sound and basic
education.226 If the court finds that the statutes serve a legitimate
government interest, the plaintiffs will ultimately fail.227
The plaintiffs in Davids outline tenure’s effect on education in New
York and argue that the state’s Permanent Employment Statutes, Dismissal
Statutes, and LIFO Statutes violate a student’s right to a sound
education.228 Much like California’s challenged statutes, the plaintiffs
offered evidence that the evaluation process for granting tenure is
inadequate, that high litigation costs discourage administrators from
dismissing ineffective teachers, and that seniority is the only factor
considered during school layoffs.229 Plaintiffs argue that effective teachers
are the primary “input” of a sound education, explaining that “students
taught by effective teachers are more likely to attend college, . . . earn
higher salaries, reside in higher quality neighborhoods, and save for
retirement.”230 Because the challenged statutes keep ineffective teachers in
the classroom, they directly contribute to the legislature’s failure to provide
a basic education.231 Therefore, the plaintiffs’ rights under the New York
Constitution are violated.232
Plaintiffs argue that New York’s Permanent Employment Statutes
ensure that ineffective teachers are almost guaranteed tenure.233 A teacher
receives tenure after two annual performance evaluations within a threeyear probationary period.234 Administrators use the Annual Professional
224 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50
(N.Y. 2006).
225 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 861 N.E.2d at 52 (quoting Campaign for Fiscal Equity
v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 2003)).
226 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 861 N.E.2d at 52.
227 Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366.
228 Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 3.
229 Wright Compl., supra note 196, at 7, 14; Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 8–15.
230 Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 8.
231 Wright Compl., supra note 196, at 3.
232 Wright Compl., supra note 196, at 22.
233 Wright Compl., supra note 196, at 10 (explaining that in 2007, ninety-seven percent
of eligible teachers received tenure).
234 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 2509, 2573, 3012 (McKinney 2014); Wright Compl., supra note
196, at 9.
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Performance Review (“APPR”) to evaluate performance.235 Teachers are
rated as “Highly Effective,” “Effective,” “Developing,” or “Ineffective.”236
Student academic growth accounts for twenty percent of a teacher’s rating,
while in-class observation and local achievement metrics account for the
remaining eighty percent.237
Plaintiffs argue that the inadequate
probationary period and the APPR’s focus on subjective factors result in
ineffective teachers earning tenure.238 An administrator cannot reasonably
determine the long-term effectiveness of a teacher within three years, and
the focus of teacher evaluations should not be reliant on subjective
factors.239 In 2013, for example, 91.5% of New York teachers were rated
as “Highly Effective” or “Effective,” while only 31% of students met
standardized test proficiency in English and Mathematics.240 These results
do not support the position that students are being provided a basic
education under the standard established in Fiscal Equity.241 If the
plaintiffs can show that the Permanent Employment Statutes inadequately
rate teachers and directly harm education, the statute will likely fail under
the rational basis test.
Plaintiffs also claim that the Dismissal Statutes require a number of
unnecessary hurdles to be cleared before a teacher’s employment is
terminated, leaving ineffective teachers in the classroom. 242 New York’s
public employees are afforded due process rights before being dismissed.243
An employer must provide notice and the right to respond before the
termination is effective.244 According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the
Dismissal Statutes provide teachers in New York with “super due process”
that results in years of expensive litigation.245 One study cited in the
complaint concluded that the average dismissal costs $313,000 and can last
two and a half years.246 This discourages administrators from even

235

Wright Compl., supra note 196, at 10.
Id.
237 Id. at 10–11.
238 Id. at 11.
239 Id. at 12–13.
240 Cathy Woodruff, Why Are Most Teachers Rated Effective When Most Students Test
Below Standards?, N.Y. STATE SCH. BDS. ASSOC. (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.nyssba.org/news/2013/12/12/on-board-online-december-16-2013/why-are-mostteachers-rated-effective-when-most-students-test-below-standards/.
241 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. 2006).
242 See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3020 (McKinney 2014); Davids Compl., supra note
196, at 11.
243 See Beck-Nichols v. Bianco, 987 N.E.2d 233, 242 (N.Y. 2013).
244 Id.
245 Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 11.
246 Id. (citing Accountability for All, N.Y. STATE SCH. BDS. ASSOC. 1 (Mar. 2007),
http://www.nyssba.org/clientuploads/gr_3020a_reform.pdf).
236
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attempting to remove a tenured teacher.247 Because this process results in
ineffective teachers remaining in New York classrooms, the statute will
most likely fail to meet the constitutional floor established by courts.
Lastly, the plaintiffs argue that the LIFO Statutes protect ineffective
teachers from facing dismissal and harm students’ right to a sound and
basic education.248 The New York LIFO Statutes require administrators to
exclusively consider seniority as the determinant for dismissal when school
layoffs are necessary;249 no consideration is given to teacher quality or
effectiveness.250 As mentioned earlier, tenure’s goal is to retain a level of
expertise within the profession. The LIFO Statutes do, in fact, offer
employment protection to effective teachers who have seniority. This
obviously adds to the quality of education in New York. An automatic
protection for senior teachers, however, is not the only way to achieve this
goal. The defendants in Davids will need to argue that ineffective teachers
with seniority should remain employed over more effective junior teachers
during school layoffs.251 This position is untenable. Because the LIFO
Statutes keep ineffective teachers in the classroom, these statutes
negatively affect the quality of education and ultimately violate the state
constitution.252
Although New York offers the right to education the lowest level of
equal protection analysis, the court in Davids should find the Permanent
Employment Statutes, Dismissal Statutes, and LIFO Statutes void.253
Plaintiffs offered ample evidence to suggest that the challenged statutes fail
to meet the constitutional floor described in Fiscal Equity.254 Because
education is not a fundamental right, legislation affecting its quality only
needs to serve a legitimate government interest; however it still must meet
this constitutional floor.255 While providing job security to teachers adds to
the expertise within the profession, the current legislation in New York is
not the best way to meet this goal. Keeping ineffective teachers in the
classroom only hurts students and does not fulfill the legislature’s
obligation to provide a sound and basic education. For these reasons, the
court in Davids should find the challenged statutes unconstitutional and
247
248
249

See Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 12.
Id. at 13.
N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 2585, 3013 (McKinney 2014); Davids Compl., supra note 196,

at 13.
250
251
252
253
254
255

366.

See supra note 249.
See Vergara v. California, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).
Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 1415.
Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982).
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. 2006).
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959); Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at
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direct the legislature to reform state tenure laws.
C. Balancing Tenure and Education
Though it has only been in effect for one full academic year, the
TEACHNJ Act is an example of how California and New York can balance
job protection, state equal protection requirements, and the state’s
obligation to provide an education.256 The law ensures that earning tenure
in New Jersey is no longer a rubberstamp process, where the only
requirement is surviving a three-year probationary period.257 The law
requires a more thoughtful evaluation of a teacher’s skills and training over
four years.258 The evaluations are regulated by uniform state standards and
are administered by various education experts and professionals.259 Once
tenure is earned, the benefit is not conferred for life.260 Teachers who fail
to remain effective throughout their careers may lose tenure; however, this
does not happen immediately.261 The teacher has two years to prove his or
her effectiveness in the classroom after tenure is lost.262 This balances the
employment interests of teachers and allows the state to provide students
with the best possible educators.
New Jersey’s approach would most likely pass the constitutional
standards of both California and New York while positively contributing to
each state’s ailing school districts. California and New York approach the
constitutional obligation to education differently; however, each state’s
high court recognizes education’s importance.263 Because teachers have
the most influence on a student’s education, legislatures must ensure that
the most effective teachers remain in the classroom.264 New Jersey’s tenure
model serves both California’s high constitutional standard and New
York’s requirement to provide a sound and basic education.265 Instituting a
comprehensive evaluation process and protecting effective teachers only
adds to the educational experience, protects students’ rights, and fulfills
California’s and New York’s commitment to providing an education to
their students.
256

N.J. STAT. § 18A:6-117 (West 2012).
N.J. STAT. § 18A:28-5; McNeal, supra note 144, at 501.
258 See supra note 257.
259 N.J. STAT. § 18A:6-112, 119.
260 Id.; McNeal, supra note 144, at 501.
261 N.J. STAT. § 18A:6-117; McNeal, supra note 144, at 501.
262 See supra note 261.
263 See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971); Bd. of Educ. v. 439 N.E.S.2d
359, 366 (N.Y. 1982).
264 See Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 8.
265 Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1255; Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50,
53 (N.Y. 2006).
257
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VI. CONCLUSION
State and federal courts have consistently recognized education’s
importance to society.266 While each jurisdiction has differing views of the
constitutional obligation to provide an education, New York, New Jersey,
and California agree that a certain level of education must be available to
all students.267 Even at the lowest level of equal protection analysis, state
courts and legislatures are obligated to ensure that laws bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate government interest. When teacher tenure
statutes interfere with the classroom experience and create disruption in a
student’s learning environment, those laws fail both strict scrutiny and
rational basis review, and therefore must be changed. For these reasons,
the challenged teacher tenure statutes in California and New York should
be repealed and a new statutory scheme, like the TEACHNJ Act, should be
instituted.

266

See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973); Robinson v.
Cahill, 303 A.2d. 273, 286 (N.J. 1973).
267 Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1256; Robinson, 303 A.2d. at 286; Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
828 N.E.2d at 53.

